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Why individuals make charitable contributions and voluntarily provide public goods 
is an important question in modern society. Extensive research on voluntary contributions 
has been conducted by economists (Davis & Holt, 1993; Ledyard, 1995) and 
psychologists (Dawes, 1980).   
Many theories have been proposed to explain why individuals give (or cooperate) 
when it is in their own (financial) interest to free or cheap-ride. Explanations include 
altruism (e.g. Becker, 1974; Andreoni, 1988), warm-glow and warm-glow altruism (e.g. 
Andreoni, 1989, 1990), conditional cooperation (e.g. Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr, 
2001), and reciprocity (e.g. Sugden, 1984).  These motivations have been studied using 
experimental data from the lab and naturally-occurring (empirical) data. 
Only very recently, field experiments have been introduced as a research tool in 
studying public goods provision and charitable contributions in economics (e.g. List & 
Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Eckel & Grossman, 2003, and other articles in this volume).1 List 
and Lucking-Reiley study the effect of seed money and refunds in a university fund 
raising campaign.  They find that increasing the proportion of seed money increases both 
                                                 
1Research in psychology and marketing has used field experiments in studying charitable giving (for a review, see 
Weyant, 1996). Influence techniques studied include foot-in-the-door, door-in-the-face, low-ball, and legitimization-of-
small-donation.  The results, however, are mixed; some research shows positive effects (e.g. Brockner, Guzzi, Kane, 
Levin & Shaplen, 1984), while others show no effects (e.g. Fraser, Hite & Sauer, 1988). 
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participation rates and the average amount of contribution while instituting a refund only 
increases the average amount of contribution, but not the participation rate. Eckel and 
Grossman study the effect of rebates as compared with matching in a public radio 
fundraising campaign via mail. They find that matching and rebates solicit about the 
same number of contributions, but that matching generates higher average amounts 
contributed.  Note that both of these two experiments manipulate the payoff structure 
faced by individual donors. 
Instead of manipulating the payoff structure our research introduces a new factor that 
influences contribution behavior: social comparisons. While previous research has 
suggested that social comparisons can have negative consequences for efficiency and 
social welfare, for example, by leading individuals to overconsume (e.g. Frank 1999, 
1985), this project identifies a positive impact of social comparisons; it can be used to 
enhance contributions to public goods. 
In this article, we summarize our findings from three working papers, and report the 
results of a new field experiment in which social comparisons are manipulated and shown 
to increase average individual contribution in the field. Our setting is a fundraising 
campaign for a public radio station.  
We begin by introducing the concept of social comparisons and discussing how they 
might influence charitable giving. In the second section, we describe our previous 
research and its results.  Section 3 descries the new field experiment and its results. We 
conclude with a brief summary describing our results, their implications for 
understanding charitable contributions, and their applications for non-profit organizations 
more broadly. 
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Social Comparisons  
Social comparisons were first studied by Festinger (1954). His original proposal was 
that people use three distinct processes to form an accurate view of themselves.2 The first 
process involves using objective standards to evaluate their actions. For example, when I 
need to decide how much I should contribute to a local public radio station, I can listen to 
the on-air fundraising campaigns, and might donate the station-recommended amount. 
Second, people compare themselves to similar others, especially when an objective 
standard is not available or is not perceived as relevant. For example, I might believe that 
the station-recommend amounts are not objective (since they come from an interested 
party), so instead I might ask my friends how much they contributed and use that 
information to evaluate my own potential contribution levels.  Third, people compare 
themselves not with similar others (others in their own position) but with individuals who 
have similar attributes.  For example, if none of my friends contribute to the same station 
as I do, I might compare my contribution with other donors’ contribution to judge the 
appropriateness of my actions.   
The social comparisons studied in our research refer primarily to the third, more 
socially-oriented comparison processes in Festinger’s initial proposal. That is, we will 
use social comparisons to refer to the process whereby people compare themselves to 
others who share attributes with themselves.  In a nonprofit fundraising context, this 
means that individuals compare themselves with other donors to the same nonprofit.  
Festinger’s initial proposal later developed into a large stream of research on what 
kinds of social comparisons people seek in order to feel good about themselves (to 
                                                 
2Later this theory was extended into using social information to form an accurate view of the world outside of oneself 
(Suls, 2000). 
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achieve high self-evaluation or to accomplish self-enhancement, e.g. Taylor & Lobel, 
1989). In contrast, our research does not examine the cause of social comparisons, nor are 
we interested in how people evaluate themselves. Rather, we are interested in how social 
comparisons influence contribution behavior.  Our participants do not choose with whom 
they wish to compare themselves; they only decide what to do in response to social 
comparison information that we provide.  We manipulate this information, and examine 
the consequences of this manipulation on individuals’ behavior.   
In this study, we communicate to contributors how much a previous donor had 
contributed in the social comparison conditions, while they get no such information in the 
control condition.  We then look at the impact of this social comparison information on 
contribution behavior. 
Social Comparisons in Nonprofit Fundraising  
In this research, we wanted to demonstrate the impact of social comparisons in public 
goods settings in a field setting.  A related question has been studied in the lab using a 
dictator game (Cason & Mui 1998). Subjects made two $40 dictator game decisions, one 
before and one after they learned the decision of another subject (or, in the control 
condition, another subject's birthday).  Overall participants become more self-regarding 
in the second decision, although this effect is significant in the control condition and 
insignificant in the experimental condition. Thus they conclude that social comparison 
information can increase contributions, or at least retard the natural decrease of 
contributions.  In our field study, we provide information on another (generous) donor 
and examine the impact of that information on the target donor's decision. 
Only one very recent study has examined social comparisons in the field.  Frey and 
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Meier (2004) use a mail fundraising campaign run by the university.  Some students 
receive a letter telling them that 64% of other students had previously contributed (this 
represents the number who actually contributed in the last year).  Other students receive a 
letter telling them that 46% of other students had previously contributed (this represents 
the number who actually contributed over the last 10 years).  Seventy-seven percent of 
students in the 64% treatment (high social comparison) contribute to the fund, while 
74.7% of students in the 46% treatment (low social comparison) contribute.  A more 
complicated logit model including controls for previous contribution history of each 
student finds a statistical difference between the two treatments.  While this paper 
examines the impact of social comparisons on participation rate, we will study the 
impact of social comparisons on contribution amount.   
We sought a naturally-occurring institution that captured the public good structure, 
where each individual has an incentive to free ride, but where the group as a whole is 
better off when everyone contributes.  We identified public radio as one such setting.  
Each individual has an incentive to free ride, listen to the station, and not contribute to its 
continued functioning. However, the community as a whole is better off when the 
community is funded.  This field setting offers us the potential to offer social comparison 
information to contributors in a natural way. 
We collaborated with a public radio station to implement this experiment.  This 
station has three on-air fund drives per year.  During the drive listeners call into the 
station to make contributions.  There are many recommended contribution levels being 
discussed on the air, $50 is required to become a basic member, listeners who give $60 
and $75 receive additional gifts.  Other gift levels kick in at $120, $180, $240, $360, 
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$600, $840, $1000 and $2500.  Because there are so many levels, Festinger’s first 
category of objective comparison information is not salient in this situation.  
Second, the listeners are geographically and socially distant.  Thus, we hypothesize 
that the second social comparison process is similarly weak.  We focus on the third, 
providing information about another donor’s contribution. 
Our Previous Work 
 Three previous papers of ours examine the impact of social comparisons in the 
field.  This section reviews this research, beginning by introducing the experimental 
design which we use again in collecting the new data provided in the next section. 
 This research has been conducted in collaboration with a number of public radio 
stations during their annual on-air fund-drives.  During the on-air drive, the station DJs 
intersperse music with appeals for donations.  Listeners respond to the on-air appeals 
during the drive and call the station to make a pledge. Experimenters answer the phone as 
volunteers for the station, ask the routine questions for the station and implemented the 
social comparison manipulation in the appropriate place in the conversation.   
In particular, after answering the phone with the station’s identifier: “Hello, 
STATION_NAME member line,” experimenters asked: “Are you a new member or a 
renewing member of STATION-NAME?” After the caller answered, experimenters read 
(or did not read in the control condition) the social comparison manipulation: “We had 
another member, they contributed $x.”  We manipulated both the existence of this 
manipulation and the amount named.  The question asked right after the manipulation 
was: “How much would you like to pledge today?” The dependent measure, the pledge 
amount, was then collected. We also ensured that another member had indeed contributed 
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the amount we suggested earlier in the fund drive, so that our statements would not 
constitute deception. 
Our first paper, Shang and Croson (2004a), we report the results of our first fund 
drive where we compare the control treatment (no social comparison) to our initial, high, 
level of social comparison ($300).  This paper focuses on the response of new donors to 
the social comparison manipulation. We chose $300 as an appropriate amount in 
consultation with the station, and from reading the literature on goal-setting, which 
suggests that goals representing the 90-95 percentile of responses are most motivating. 
For this particular station, $300 represents the 94th percentile of contributions by new 
members.   
Our results are encouraging. This high social comparison significantly increased 
contributions by new members over the control condition (by about $52 or 43%).  We 
thus demonstrate the impact of social comparisons on public goods provision in the field 
setting.   
This paper goes on to further develop the argument that the process underlying the 
increased contribution is indeed social comparisons and not some other process.  A 
second experiment shows that when the donor and the social comparison target are of the 
same gender (more similar) the effect is larger than when they are of different genders 
(less similar).   
Our second paper, Shang and Croson (2004b) extends our findings from the first by 
looking at new and renewing members’ contributions.  We explore additional social 
comparison levels; $75 and $180 (50th percentile and 80th percentile respectively).  In 
addition we collect other information on these donors, and thus can control for income 
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(via zip code) and a variety of other socioeconomic factors.  We show that while social 
comparisons directly affect new members’ contributions (as shown in Shang and Croson 
2004a), they do not seem to affect renewing members’ contributions to the same degree. 
This paper also collects and analyzes “followup” data; that is, the contributions of the 
participants in our experiment one year later.  One might imagine a series of competing 
ex-ante hypotheses about the long-term effects of a social comparison manipulation like 
this.  One possibility, based on cognitive dissonance, is that once an individual gives 
more because of this manipulation they will continue to give more.  A second, based on 
crowding out, is that after giving more this year they will be less likely to contribute in a 
subsequent year, or will contribute less.  Finally, one might imagine that one year later 
donors simply revert to the behavior that they would have exhibited without the 
manipulation.  In fact, this third effect is exactly what is found.  One year later there are 
no significant differences in giving between participants who were in the control 
treatment and in the social comparison treatments. 
Our third paper, Shang and Croson (2004c), focuses on renewing members and 
attempts to explain their lack of responsiveness found in the previous paper.  In addition 
to the phone data from above, we also collect data from the renewal mail campaign used 
by the stations.  Here we manipulate a sentence on the response sheet where donors 
record their contributions.  This sentence says “STATION_NAME received a 
contribution [of $x] from a member like you, and we invite you to join this member in 
renewing your membership today!,” where the text in the brackets is included in the 
experimental conditions but not in the control conditions. Then the pledge amounts were 
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collected with this sentence right below the manipulation:  “Yes! Here is my contribution 
of ____________.” 
For renewing members we compare not their absolute contribution, but the change in 
their contribution between this drive and the previous drive as a function of the social 
comparison condition.  In particular, we code for each individual whether they received a 
social comparison that was higher or lower than what they had contributed the previous 
year.  We find that those who receive an upward social comparison increase their 
contribution, and those who receive a downward social comparison decrease their 
contribution.  Those in the control condition (and those whose social comparison is the 
same as their previous contribution) do not significantly change their contribution.  
Statistical tests confirm that these treatments are significantly different from each other. 
Three previous papers of ours demonstrate the impact of social comparisons on 
voluntary contributions to public goods.  Overall we find that social comparisons increase 
contributions and this effect is stronger when the similarity between the donor and the 
target is stronger (Shang and Croson 2004a).  We find that this effect is significant in new 
members and not in renewing members, and we observe no long-term reduction (or 
increase) in contributions one year later (Shang and Croson 2004b).  Finally, we find that 
social comparisons do affect renewing members but not in the way anticipated; instead 
they adjust their contribution in the direction of the social comparison (Shang and Croson 
2004c).  
This article presents the results of a new experiment designed to test the limits of 
social comparisons.  Here we examine the effect of extreme social comparisons, choosing 
levels that are quite high relative to the typical contribution. 
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A New Field Experiment 
This field experiment was conducted with an anonymous public radio station during 
their February on-air fund drive in 2004.  We wanted to test the limits of our findings in 
Shang and Croson (2004a) by examining the impact of very high social comparison 
levels.  In particular, we compare the control condition from the previous paper with a 
new one with a social comparison level of $600 (the 97th percentile of contributions).  
The station was concerned about this high number “scaring off” new contributors, thus 
we offered it only to renewing members.   
Remember that in Shang and Croson (2004a, 2004c) we found that social 
comparisons at the 95th percentile level did not affect the absolute contributions of 
renewing members, just their change in contributions.  In contrast, here we find that 
sufficiently high social comparisons do affect the absolute contributions of renewing 
members. 
Method 
Design. As in our previous studies, potential donors call to make contributions to the 
station during the on-air campaign.  We provide renewing members with high social 
comparisons, and examine the impact on their pledges. 
Results 
 Because our previous manipulations had been successful for increasing revenues 
for the station, they asked that we over-sample the experimental condition.  We thus used 
a ratio of 3:1 in preparing our experimental materials.  For every one caller who 
randomly received the control condition three callers would randomly receive the 
experimental condition.  After preparing the response forms in the appropriate ratio, the 
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forms were shuffled together to randomize.  When the phone rang and the caller 
answered that they were a renewing member, the research assistant chose the top form 
from the (face down) pile and read the appropriate sentence.  After this randomization, 
we had 56 callers in our control condition and 140 callers in our experimental condition 
during this drive.  We first compare the amounts contributed directly in Figure 1, below.   
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Figure 1:  Mean Contribution in Control and $600 Social Comparison Conditions 
 
As can be seen in the figure, the average contribution in the control condition was 
$121, while the average contribution in the treatment condition was $172.  This 
represents an increase of $52 per caller, about 43% by using a high social comparison 
number.  A t-test finds this difference statistically significant (t=2.036, p=0.022).   
For additional control, we also ran an OLS regression on the amounts contributed, 
including controls for the gender of the caller (previously observed to have some impact) 
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and the day and hour that the call arrived.  This particular station has extremely varied 
programming, and we wanted to control for the fact that callers who typically listen to 
music in the morning might be systematically different than callers who typically listen to 
news at night.  Table 1 presents the result of the OLS regression with these additional 
controls. Our initial result remains statistically significant in the regression format. 
estimate SE p
$600 Treat 54.960 27.338 0.046
Male 14.023 24.731 0.571
Day yes
Hour yes
N 193
R-Squared 0.074  
Table 1:  OLS Regression of Contribution on Treatment and Controls 
 
 One final statistic of interest is the distribution of contributions in the two 
treatments.  These distributions are shown in their entirety in Figure 2, below and 
summarized in Figure 3.   
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Figure 2:  Histogram of Contributions Received 
As expected, this distribution has spikes, including a large spike at $120 which 
represents $10 per month, includes a number of extra gifts and is a large attractor for 
renewing donors.  There are smaller spikes at other gift levels including $75 and $240.   
 
 14
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Below
60
75-100 120 120-200 240-480 Above
600
Contribution Amount
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
Control
$600 
Figure 3:  Percentage of Contributions in Two Treatments, Collapsed 
  
Differences between the two treatments are easier to see in Figure 3, above. The 
first difference is the existence of contributions at or above $600 in the social comparison 
treatment that are not present in the control treatment.  These contributions suggest that 
some callers are trying to match (or beat) the contributions made by the social 
comparison target.  But of particular interest is the large increase in the percentage of 
contributions in the $240-$480 range.  These seem to be callers who would otherwise 
have given lower amounts (e.g. $120) and instead are influenced to increase their 
contribution by the existence of the social comparison target.  We believe that this 
shading is the main source of the impact of social comparisons and provides evidence 
that social comparisons can impact decisions even when donors don't attempt to match or 
beat the social comparison level.  Instead, the existence of an ambitious social 
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comparison can make lower-level donors slightly more generous. 
Conclusions  
 Results from this study reinforce those in our previous research; social 
comparisons impact contributions.  In this study presenting target donors with 
information about a high social comparison significantly increases their own decision.  
This effect represents a potential increase in revenue of the nonprofit of 43%. 
Discussion and Future Research 
Field experiments offer a unique opportunity to study the influence of social 
psychological processes on public goods provision. In our study we were able to remove 
the upper bound on giving typically imposed by dictator games experimenters in the 
laboratory and could observe donor behavior in a more natural and realistic setting. 
However, field experiments have limitations as well.  While one can demonstrate that 
an effect exists, it is much harder to conclude why the effect exists.  We intend to further 
examine this question in the lab.  A second limitation of field experiments involves the 
generalizability of the results.  It is possible that we observed our results due to the choice 
of this particular nonprofit radio station and this particular experimental implementation, 
and that they might not be observed elsewhere.  For example, this experiment involved 
existing contributors to the station; would the results generalize to new members?  
Similarly, this manipulation was done via the phone; would the results generalize to mail 
or web contributions? 
Our related research, however, suggests that the social comparison effect is indeed 
general.  Shang and Croson (2004a) shows the influence of social comparisons on new 
donors.  Shang and Croson (2004b) demonstrates the robustness of this result using 
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different social comparison levels and finding no long-term reduction in contributions 
one year later.  Shang and Croson (2004c) finds that renewing donors adjust their 
previous contribution in the direction of the social comparison target. 
In summary, this research demonstrates the impact of social comparisons on 
charitable giving in a field study using a public radio station.  Contemporary and future 
research explores the same effect in different domains, using different members and 
different social comparison levels.  This stream of research more generally provides for a 
deeper understanding of what motivates individuals to contribute toward the funding of 
public goods and other charitable organizations. 
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